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Introduction
It seems that
P Every sentence is either true or untrue1.
But, if so, what about the Liar sentence below?
$ The sentence marked with a dollar is untrue.
$ contradicts P, for it is true if, and only if, it is untrue. To (dis)solve the problem,
Kripke (1975) proposes to reject P and, exploiting the 3-valued logic called Strong
Kleene, constructs a partial model for the truth predicate, where sentences like $ are
‘undefined’, i.e. they lack a truth value.
Within Kripke’s model, however, also the so-called Truth-teller
e The sentence marked with a euro is true.
lacks a truth value. Yet, $ and e are, admittedly, very different: the latter can con-
sistently be declared true or untrue; the former cannot. An adequate model for the
truth predicate ought to account for their diversity.
The purpose of this paper is to put forward a new response to the Liar paradox,
which extends and improves the work done by Saul Kripke in his seminalOutline of
a Theory of Truth.
The plan is as follows: after technical preliminaries in § 1 (including the con-
struction of the formal Liar sentence), I go on in § 2 to present a new model for the
truthpredicate alongwith anew4-valued logic, therebyproposing thenewresponse
to the Liar paradox. The final section 3 examines the properties of the model, prov-
ing what I shall call ‘metalinguistic T-Schema’.
A last remark before I begin: In what follows I assume the reader is familiar with
(i) Peano arithmetic, (ii) the arithmetization of syntax, and (iii) Kripke’s Outline of a
Theory of Truth2.
1The either ... or is to be read here as an exclusive disjunction.
2There is an extensive literature on Kripke’s Outline. A more philosophical and informal introduc-
tion is offered by Burgess, (2011). For more information on the mathematical aspects of Kripke’s con-
struction see, for example, Fitting, (1986) and McGee, (1991, §§4-5). The axiomatic theory known as
Kripke-Feferman (KF) was first given by Reinhardt, (1986) and Feferman, (1991). Feferman, (1991) also
determines its proof-theoretic strength. Cantini, (1989) gives a more direct proof-theoretic analysis of
KF and some of its subsystems. In KF, the partial notion of truth advanced by Kripke is axiomatised in
classical logic. Therefore, outer logic (what is provable) and inner logic (what is provably true) of that
system differs substantially. Halbach and Horsten, (2006) (see also Horsten, 2011, §9.5) have proposed
an interesting axiomatisation in partial logic, creating a system, called “partial Kripke-Feferman” (PKF),
within which the two logics coincide. In that system, gaps but no gluts are admitted. Halbach, (2014,
§16) proposes a system that admits both. For critical discussions of Kripke’s position see, among others,
Gupta, (1982, pp. 30-37) and Field, (2008, §3).
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1 The Formalised Liar
1.1 Technical Preliminaries
The object language of this work will be the language of Peano arithmetic (PA) ex-
tendedby the unary truth predicateT . I shall call the language of PA, withoutT ,Lpa ;
the extended language will be called L tpa3. As “official” logical vocabulary, I shall
use the existential quantifier ∃, the negation and disjunction symbols ¬, ∨, and the
identity symbol . As usual, however, abbreviations will be used. A standard Gödel
numbering of L tpa-expressions will be assumed throughout the work, without go-
ing into details4. The Gödel number (or code) of a formula ϕ is gn(ϕ), and pϕq is the
numeral of gn(ϕ). I shall distinguish between natural numbers and L tpa-numerals
exploiting boldfaced characters: the natural numbers arewritten “0, 1, 2, . . . , n” (not
boldfaced) and theL tpa-numerals “0, 1, 2, . . . , n” (boldfaced), where “1, 2, 3 . . .” ab-
breviates “0′, 0′′, 0′′′ . . .”. Formulae with one free variable are indicated by ϕ(vi ); ϕ(t )
denotes ϕ[t /vi ], i.e. the result of substituting t for vi in ϕ. I write ϕ ≡ ψ to indicate
that ϕ and ψ are names of the same formula.
〈M, (E∞, A∞)〉 is Kripke’s minimal fixed point (henceforth: MFP), and
‘〈M, (E∞, A∞)〉 |=sk ϕ’ means that ϕ is true in MFP, according to the Strong Kleene.
Furthermore, I shall make use of the following metalinguistic symbols:
• ¬ for “non . . . ”.
• 0 for “. . . or . . . ”.
• 1 for “. . . and . . . ”.
• ⇒ for “if . . . , then . . . ”.
• ⇔ for “. . . if, and only if, . . . ”.
• ∃ for “there is . . . ”.
• \∀ for “for all . . . ”.
1.2 λ ↔ ¬T pλq
The Diagonal Lemma5 is, as McGee, (1991, p. 24) put it, “a cornerstone of modern
logic”. He even adds that “most of the results of [Truth, Vagueness, and Paradox]
can be regarded as corollaries to this basic result”. In this section I shall exploit the
typical diagonal construction, in order to obtain the formalised liar antinomy.
3Notice that we are just extending the language of PA, not the theory, i.e. we are not adding axioms
for T , creating a new theory, say PAT. In addition, we can impose a restriction on the induction schema
toLpa -formulae, i.e., an instance of
(ϕ(0) ∧ ∀vi (ϕ(vi )→ ϕ(v ′i )))→ ∀vi (ϕ(vi ))
is an axiom, only ifT does not occur in ϕ.
4See, for instance, Boolos, Burgess, and Jeffrey, (2007) and Smith, (2013).
5Or Fixed Point Lemma, or Self-Referential Lemma.
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Before I begin, the concept of diagonalization of a formula must be introduced:
The diagonalization of ϕ is the expression ∃v0(v0  pϕq ∧ ϕ).
Even if this notionmakes sense for arbitrary expressions, it is of most interest in the
case of a formula ϕ(v0)with just one variable v0 free. Since an expression of the form
ϕ(t ) is equivalent to ∃v0(v0  t ∧ ϕ(v0)), the diagonalization of ϕ(v0) is equivalent
to ϕ(pϕq). That is: the diagonalization of a formula ϕ(v0) is true (in the standard
interpretation) if, and only if, it is satisfied by its own code.
There is also a recursive function diag that, when applied to the Gödel number
of a formula, yields the Gödel number of its diagonalization. That is to say: if the
code of a formula ϕ is n and the code of its diagonalization ism, then diag (n) = m.
A more formal definition is:
diag (n) = gn∃v0(v0   ? numn ? gn ∧  ? n ? gn),
where ? and num represent, respectively, the concatenation and thenumeral func-
tions, both recursive6.
Lemma 1.1. (THE FORMALISED LIAR) There is aL tpa-sentence λ, such that
PA ` λ ↔ ¬T pλq
Proof. SincePA represents every primitive recursive function, diag is representable
in PA. Let Diag(v0, v1) be a formula representing diag , so that for any a and b , if
diag (a) = b , then
PA ` ∀v1(Diag(a, v1)↔ v1  b) (1)
Diag is a complexLpa-formula, not containing the new predicateT .
Let now β(v0) be the formula
∃v1(Diag(v0, v1) ∧ ¬T (v1)) (β(v0))
Intuitively, β(v0) says that the diagonalization of a formula is not true, without yet
sayingwhich formula. Let’s now consider the diagonalization of β(v0), and let’s call
it λ:
∃v0(v0  p βq ∧ β(v0)) (λ)
6The concatenation function? is such that, if s and t are the codes of two expressions, then s ?t is the
code of the first expression followed by the second. The numeral function num maps each n to the code
of the numeral n. The function diag could have been defined more precisely by first showing that also
the logical operations of conjunction and existential quantification are recursive. For more information
see Boolos, Burgess, and Jeffrey, (2007, p. 221, §15).
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In other symbols, λ is
∃v0
 
v0  p βq ∧ ∃v1(Diag(v0, v1) ∧ ¬T (v1))
This is logically equivalent to β(p βq), i.e. the result of substituting p βq forv0 in β(v0):
∃v1(Diag(p βq, v1) ∧ ¬T (v1)) (2)
Reading (2) in English, we get something like: “there is a number that has two prop-
erties: first, it is the code of the diagonalization of β(v0); second, it is not element of
the extension of T ”. Or, more intuitively: “the diagonalization of β is not true”. In-
teresting enough, the diagonalization of β is precisely λ. Accordingly, λ is logically
equivalent to a sentence that says that λ is not true.
We have thus far constructed, within the formal languageL tpa , a sentence saying
of itself that it is not true7. The next step consists in proving, within PA, something
about this sentence. Since λ is logically equivalent to (2), we have:
PA ` λ ↔ ∃v1(Diag(p βq, v1) ∧ ¬T (v1)) (3)
We do not know, whether λ is a theorem of PA. We do know, however, that it is the
diagonalization of β, and hence diag  gn(β) = gn(λ). From this, by (1), follows
PA ` ∀v1(Diag(p βq, v1)↔ v1  pλq) (4)
That is, pλq is the only closed term satisfying the open formulaDiag(p βq, v1)8. Sim-
ple logic then gives, from (3) and (4):
PA ` λ ↔ ∃v1(v1  pλq ∧ ¬T (v1)) (5)
Since ∃v1(v1  pλq ∧ ¬T (v1)) is equivalent to ¬T (pλq), we have:
PA ` λ ↔ ¬T pλq 
This is the formal counterpart of the paradoxical Liar sentence: a sentence that
is provably equivalent to a sentence saying that its code is not element of the exten-
sion of the truth predicate. “But note that [λ] is produced by a simple diagonaliza-
tion construction [...]; and the construction yields a theorem, not a paradox” (Smith,
7Whether this sentence “says of itself that it is not true” is not as obvious as one might think. For an
insightful discussion about self-reference in arithmetic, see Halbach and Visser, (2014a,b).
8Note that (4) is equivalent to the conjunction of PA ` Diag(p βq, pλq) and
PA ` ∀v1(¬(v1  pλq)→ ¬Diag(p βq, v1)).
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2013, p. 198). The “formal Liar paradox” arises if wewant our theory of truth to prove
the T-Schema ϕ↔ T pϕq for all sentences ϕ ∈ L tpa .
Yet, this is by nomeans necessary. Kripke (1975) proposes to give up the beloved
T-Schema, constructing a partial model for the truth predicate, where both λ ↔
T pλq and λ ↔ ¬T pλq are neither true nor untrue, i.e. they are undefined. As indi-
cated in the INTRODUCTION, I assume the readerbeing familiarwithKripke’sOutline.
I omit completely the presentation of his work. Here I shall just state two important
features of MFP, described by Kripke (1975, p. 708) as “probably the most natural
model for the intuitive concept of truth”.
Fact 1.2. MFP verifies the metalinguistic T-Schema, i.e.: for all sentences ϕ ∈ L tpa ,
〈M, (E∞, A∞)〉 |=sk ϕ ⇔ 〈M, (E∞, A∞)〉 |=sk T pϕq
〈M, (E∞, A∞)〉 |=sk ¬ϕ ⇔ 〈M, (E∞, A∞)〉 |=sk ¬T pϕq
Fact 1.3. InMFP both the Liar sentence λ and the Truth-teller τ are undefined.
2 Towards a NewModel
In this section I shall put forward the new response to the Liar antinomy. The gist
of my proposal is that ‘paradoxical’ ought to be treated as a truth value. Liar sen-
tences, according to the present suggestion, do not simply lack a truth value. They
do possess one: they are paradoxical. As has been noted in the INTRODUCTION, the
trigger of my considerations will be the difference between the Liar and the Truth-
teller. Themain goal is to construct amodel within which (i) the difference between
paradoxical and unparadoxical statements is detected, and (ii) everyL tpa-sentence
ϕ has the same truth value asT pϕq (that’s the metalinguistic T-Schema).
The plan is as follows: the next subsection contains philosophical arguments: I
try to explainwhy Kripke’s proposal is not sufficiently satisfactory as response to the
Liar, and why, more generally, hisMFP does not adequately model the truth predi-
cate. In addition, I shall explain why ‘paradoxical’ should be treated as a truth value.
The remaining subsections carry out this idea formally.
2.1 Why?
Without aiming tobe censorious towardKripke’s proposal, but ratherwith the inten-
tionof further developinghis elegant ideas, I think that his construction suffers from
two inadequacies, which can (I hope) be removed. A first, minor problem his pro-
posal is confrontedwith is that using the value ‘undefined’ for paradoxical sentences
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does not seem entirely adequate9 – at least if we adhere to the original meaning at-
tributed to it by Kleene, (1971). A second, major problem is that Kripke’sMFP does
not model the truth predicate in a satisfactory way. Let me elaborate these reasons
in turn.
In both Kleene’s logics (the Strong and theWeak)10, the value ‘undefined’ (u) is
not treated on a pair with ‘true’ (1) and ‘false’ (0): u is not a third truth value11; it
only represents formally the lack of truth values. Secondly, and more important for
the present purposes, u is open to “arbitrariness for a classical value”: undefined
sentences can turn out to be true or false, or can arbitrarily be declared true or false.
Less tersely: as is well known, Kleene introduced the new logics in the study of
partial recursive functions, speaking of which he writes (Kleene, 1971, p. 334):
if whenQ (x) is u,Q (x)∨R(x) receives the value 1, the decisionmust (in the
general case) have beenmade in ignorance aboutQ (x), and in the face of
the possibility that, at some stage in the pursuit of the algorithm forQ (x)
later than the last one examined,Q (x)might be found to be 1 or to be 0.
He goes on (ibid., p. 335) to observe that 1, 0, and u “must be susceptible of another
meaning besides (i) ‘true’, ‘false’, ‘undefined’, namely (ii) ‘true’, ‘false’, ‘unknown (or
value immaterial)’. Here ‘unknown’ is a category, whose valuewe either do not know
or choose for the moment to disregard; and it does not then exclude the other two
possibilities ‘true’ or ‘false’ ”12.
Myquestionnow is: areparadoxical sentences like theLiar open to the samekind
of arbitrariness for a classical value? Might these sentences turn out to be true, or
false? Can we arbitrarily assign them a truth value? Hardly so. These sentences are
paradoxical precisely because the assumption that they are true, or false, generates
inconsistencies.
As already remarked, this is aminor problem. Onemight quite easily change the
interpretation of u and adjust it as pleased to paradoxes13. Nonetheless, the major
problemcontinues to flutter:MFPdoes notmodel the truth predicate adequately, as
it does not account for the difference between Liar and Truth-teller – this difference
having its roots inapeculiarity ofT . Letmemake this claimprecise, byfirst repeating
that the difference between
9Some authors have suggested that paradoxes are overdefined (both true and false), and not under-
defined (neither true nor false). See, for example, Dunn, (1969, 1976) and Priest, (1979).
10See Kleene, (1971, §64).
11Kripke (1975, fn 18) stresses the same point.
12Other philosophers have also suggested, as reported by van Fraassen, (1966, pp. 482-483), that sen-
tences that are normally taken to be neither true nor false (for instance “the king of France is wise”) “are
‘don’t cares’ for ordinary purposes, and there is therefore no reason why we should not arbitrarily assign
them some truth value”.
13For example, Priest, (1979) introduced the so-called ‘Logic of Paradox’ (LP), which has the same truth
tables as the Strong Kleene, but the interpretation of the third value is ‘true and false’, and it is, moreover,
a designated value.
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$ The sentence marked with a dollar is untrue.
and
e The sentence marked with a euro is true.
is that one canmore or less arbitrarily declare e true, or untrue, without stumbling
on logical issues; on the contrary, the only way to declare $ true, or untrue, requires
the abandonment of an important principle about truth, i.e. that nothing is both
true and untrue. Therefore, doing nothing more and nothing less than describing a
simple state of affairs, we can state that
(Fact) the truth predicate is such that, there are sentences that can consistently be in
its extension or in its anti-extension; there are sentences that cannot.
Every theory of truth ought to take (Fact) into account14.
As a matter of fact, in a substantial portion of the Outline, Kripke shows how
to categorise different kinds of sentence. A sentence is paradoxical, e.g., “if it has
no truth value in any fixed point” (Kripke, 1975, p. 708)15. A sentence is ungrounded
andunparadoxical, if it has a truth value in some fixed point, different from themin-
imal one – an example being the Truth-teller. He even emphasises that “the assign-
ment of a truth value to [the Truth-teller] is arbitrary” (ibid., p. 709)16.
The reader might therefore ask, what the point of my objection is – Kripke does
offer a way to distinguish between paradoxical and simply undefined sentences;
Kripke does account for the difference between Liars and Truth-tellers. He surely
does. But the point is that only within themetatheory one can implement that dis-
tinction. Only within an informal “metamodel” of the various fixed-point models
are we able to differentiate between paradoxical and unparadoxical sentences. The
minimal fixed point, which (repetita iuvant) is described by Kripke as “probably the
most natural model for the intuitive concept of truth” (ibid., p. 708), doesn’t see the
difference: in this model the Liar and the Truth-teller are both simply undefined.
If I am right, and if the difference between $ and e is due to the peculiarity of
T expressed by (Fact)17, then I believe it is justified to maintain the Kripke’s model
14A similar point is made by Gupta and Belnap, (1993, p. 100): “The essential thing about the Liar ap-
pears to be its instability under semantic evaluation: No matter what we hypothesize its value to be,
semantic evaluation refutes our hypothesis. A theory of truth ought to capture this intuition. It should
provide awayof distinguishing sentences that exhibit this behaviour from those that donot, and it should
explainwhy certain sentences behave this way”.
15Kripke considers only consistent fixed point, i.e. fixed point where E ∩ A = ∅. So do I.
16Halbach, (2014, p. 196) observes that “Kripke’s main contribution was not so much the construction
of the smallest fixed point [...] but rather his classification of the different consistent fixed points and the
discussion of their use for discriminating between ungrounded sentences, paradoxical sentences, and so
on”.
17Are there any other predicates which are akin toT in this respect? One is there for sure: the predicate
“is heterological” introduced by Kurt Grelling and Leonard Nelson (see Grelling and Nelson, 1907). In a
parallel work, I am trying to extend the solution presented here to handle the Grelling-Nelson paradox
too.
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is not quite accurate. I believe it is justified to maintain that we should try to find a
way to improve it.
Some suggestions have already been made: it is what McGee, (1991, pp. 110-
111) calls a ‘liberalisation of Kripke’s construction’, which allows extension and anti-
extension of T to overlap. This requires a replacement of a 3-valued logic with a 4-
valued logic having both truth value gaps and truth value gluts. The logical-mathe-
matical properties of such a liberalisation have been studied byWoodruff, (1984)18.
Such systems are of great interest for dialetheists19. But for those who do not be-
lieve that something can be ever both true and false, they are of little help. I am one
of those, and additionally I really do not believe that declaring the Liar both true
and false can represent any kind of solution to the paradox. It seems to me that the
paradox is precisely that some sentence shouldbeboth true and false. I can’t digress,
however, to discuss dialetheism – intriguing though it might be.
2.2 How?
Although I am not an advocate of dialetheism, I subscribe Visser’s words, when he
says that “[o]neattractive featureof four valued logic for the studyof theLiarParadox
is the possibility of making certain intuitive distinctions [that is: the distinction be-
tween Liars and Truth-tellers. L.C.] within one single model” (Visser, 1984, pp. 181-
182). And that iswhy I amabout to introduce anew4-valued logic, whose values are:
true, false, paradoxical, and undefined. “Why ‘paradoxical’?” – the readermight ask.
To properly answer this question, I first need to introduce the idea underlying the
new interpretation ofT .
We all agree (I venture) that an adequate interpretation of the truth predicate
ought to have an extension E and an anti-extension A. Now, since (i) I do not want
Liar sentences to simply lay outside E ∪ A with Truth-teller sentences, and since (ii)
I do not want E and A to overlap, I propose to extend Kripke’s interpretation of T
by adding a third set to it, which will contain those (codes of) sentences that, as
stated in (Fact), cannot consistently be contained in E or in A. I shall call this third
set (due to lack of imagination) X . In particular: (E, A, X ) will be the interpretation
of T , the interpretation of Lpa remaining as before, i.e. we letM be the standard
interpretation ofLpa . Consequently, 〈M, (E, A, X )〉will be the interpretation ofL tpa
with, informally:
(i) E = {gn(ϕ) | ϕ is true}; A = {gn(ϕ) | ϕ is untrue}; X = {gn(ϕ) | ϕ is paradoxical};
18See also Visser, (1984).
19Dialetheism, roughly, is the view that there are true contradictions, and a full exposition of it would
involve a great deal of technical material that we will not go into here. See Priest and Berto, (2013) for an
overview.
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(ii) E ∩ A = ∅, E ∩ X = ∅, A ∩ X = ∅;
(iii) E ∪ A ∪ X , N.
And so now the question arises, what truth value sentences like T pϕq should have,
whenever gn(ϕ) ∈ X . The answer suggested here, unsurprisingly, is that they are
paradoxical. Hence, the reason why I am proposing to take ‘paradoxical’ as a truth
value is that I think the best way to formalise (Fact) is having a threefold interpre-
tation ofT , with extension, anti-extension, and paradox-set. Accordingly, exactly as
though we were allowing E and A to overlap, a fourth truth value is needed. And no
value but ‘paradoxical’ seems to properly suit the paradox-set X .
Now, to carry out this project formally, there are above all three things to be done:
first, we need a new 4-valued logic to handle the value ‘paradoxical’; second, we
need rules determining whether a sentence is true, false, paradoxical, or undefined
in the partial model 〈M, (E, A, X )〉; third, we need a formal definition of (E, A, X ).
2.3 The New Logic
2.3.1 Truth Values and their Structure
Let C be the class of connectives of classical propositional logic. The new 4-valued
logic is defined by the structure:
W = {1, 0, p, u}
D = {1}
C = {fc | c ∈ C}
whereW is the set of truth values (true, false, paradoxical, undefined),D the set of
the sole designated value, C the set of truth functions: for every connective c ∈ C, fc
is the corresponding truth function. That is: if c ∈ C is an n-place connective, fc is a
n-place function with inputs and outputs inW .
As usual, one might order the element ofW by the relation ≤. Since u repre-
sents the lack of truth values, we will have: u ≤ 1; u ≤ 0; u ≤ p. The decision to be
made concerns the new value p. There are three possibilities. One might argue that
‘paradoxical’ represents some sense of ‘overdefined’, in which case we would have
1 ≤ p, 0 ≤ p. Or one might say that, like u, p stands for another case of ‘underde-
fined’, in which case we would have p ≤ 1 and p ≤ 0. Alternatively, one might say, as
I shall do here, that it is neither ‘overdefined’, nor ‘underdefined’, whence we have:
1, 0, and p are not comparable.
This yields a structure P = 〈W, ≤〉, which can be pictured thus:
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P
1 p 0
u
P is aposet (partially ordered set), since theordering≤ onW is a reflexive, transitive,
and antisymmetric binary relation.
Definition2.1 (CONSISTENCYANDCCPO). LetP = 〈D, ≤〉beaposet. FollowingVisser,
(1984, pp. 184-185), define
(a) A subset A ⊆ D is consistent iff each {x, y } ⊆ A has an upper bound inD .
(b) P is a complete, coherent partial order (ccpo), iff every consistent subset A ⊆ D
has a supremum.
Proposition 2.2. P is a ccpo.
Proof. It is easily verified that each consistent pair of elements {u, 0}, {u, 1}, {u, p} ⊆
W has a supremum inW (respectively: 0, 1, p)20. 
2.3.2 Truth Tables and Valuation Function
Instead of defining truth functions singularly21, I shall for simplicity use the truth ta-
bles and I shall write the simple connectives ¬, ∨, ∧ . . . instead of f¬, f∨, f∧ . . . I also
write explicitly conjunction, conditional, and biconditional, although they are de-
fined as usual through negation and disjunction.
¬
1 0
0 1
p p
u u
∨ 1 0 p u
1 1 1 1 1
0 1 0 p u
p 1 p p u
u 1 u u u
∧ 1 0 p u
1 1 0 p u
0 0 0 0 0
p p 0 p u
u u 0 u u
20Gupta and Belnap, (1993, §2C) study the mathematical properties of complete coherent partial or-
ders, which turn out to be useful in investigating truth in three-valued languages.
21For instance:
f¬(x) =

1 if x = 0
0 if x = 1
p if x = p
u if x = u
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→ 1 0 p u
1 1 0 p u
0 1 1 1 1
p 1 p p u
u 1 u u u
↔ 1 0 p u
1 1 0 p u
0 0 1 p u
p p p p u
u u u u u
Do the tables suit our intuitions about paradoxality? I will discuss this question be-
low, inDISCUSSION 2.4. But before that, let me define the valuation function
V〈M, (E,A,X )〉 : L tpa −→ {1, 0, p, u}. For the sake of readability, I shall writeV instead
ofV〈M, (E,A,X )〉.
(a) For atomicLpa-sentences:
V(ϕ) =

1 if M |= ϕ
0 if M |= ¬ϕ
(b) For atomicL tpa-sentencesT (n):
V(T (n)) =

1 if n ∈ E
0 if n ∈ A
p if n ∈ X
u if n < E ∪ A ∪ X
(c)
V(¬ϕ) =

1 if V(ϕ) = 0
0 if V(ϕ) = 1
p if V(ϕ) = p
u if V(ϕ) = u
(d)
V(∃viϕ(vi )) =

1 if ∃n ∈ N  V ϕ(n) = 1
0 if \∀n ∈ N  V ϕ(n) = 0
p if (see below)
u if (see below)
Thedefinition for compound sentences containing connectives is givenon thebasis
of the valuation scheme. The definition for quantified sentences is more intricate,
so let me explain the process that brought me at the definition presented below.
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When does a sentence beginning with a quantifier have semantic value p? The
answer to this question is crucial, since the variousparadoxical sentences are exactly
quantified sentences. More precisely, they have the form ∃v0(ϕ(v0) ∧ ¬T (v0)), where
the code of the sentence is the only object satisfying the formula ϕ(v0), so that for all
other numbers n, ϕ(n) is false.
Now, the semantic rules determining when a quantified sentence is true or false
can be borrowed from the Strong Kleene semantics adopted by Kripke – as I already
did in (d). The problem is that a companion definition for paradoxality, namely
V(∃viϕ(vi )) = p iff ∃n ∈ N  V ϕ(n) = p
is evidently inadequate, since for ϕ(v0) ≡ T (v0) there is indeed a n ∈ N such that
V(T (n)) = p, but the sentence “something is true” is not paradoxical. Certainly,
nonetheless, the condition that there must be a n ∈ N, such that V(ϕ(n)) = p, is
a necessary condition – though not sufficient.
A second thought might be
V(∃viϕ(vi )) = p iff \∀n ∈ N  V ϕ(n) = p
This also does not work, since it would not make λ, as presented in LEMMA 1.1,
paradoxical. Recall that λ is the sentence ∃v0(v0  p βq ∧ β(v0)). But the formula
v0  p βq ∧ β(v0) is not always paradoxical. Quite the opposite, for each n , gn(β),
it is false. Certainly, nonetheless, the condition that V(ϕ(n)) = p for all n ∈ N is a
sufficient condition – though not necessary.
Combining now sufficient and necessary conditions, I shall propose the follow-
ing definition:
(d)
V(∃viϕ(vi )) =

1 if ∃n ∈ N  V ϕ(n) = 1
0 if \∀n ∈ N  V ϕ(n) = 0
p if ∃n ∈ N  V ϕ(n) = p 1
\∀m ∈ N  V ϕ(m) = p 0 V ϕ(m) = 0
u if ∃n ∈ N  V ϕ(n) = u 1
¬∃n ∈ N  V ϕ(n) = 1
The universal quantifier is defined as usual thus:
∀vi (ϕ(vi )) :↔ ¬∃vi¬(ϕ(vi ))
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To complete the rough description of the new logic, let me add that validity is de-
fined in terms of truth preservation: an inference from Σ to ϕ is valid iff if for each
ψ ∈ Σ, V(ψ) = 1 (the sole designated value), thenV(ϕ) = 1.
It would be interesting to compare this logic with some of the 4-valued logics al-
ready studied in the literature. But this demands a larger discussion than is possible
here. I shall only make one quick remark:
Remark 2.3. Disjunctive syllogism (from ϕ ∨ ψ and ¬ϕ infer ψ) is not valid in the 4-
valued logic called first degree entailment. This is due to the fact that the designated
values of this logic are 1 and b (= ‘both’). As an example, assume that ϕ = b and
ψ = 0; then ¬ϕ, ϕ∨ψ |,FDE ψ, since both ¬ϕ and ϕ∨ψ are designated (namely b), but
ψ undesignated. On the contrary, it is easily verified that in the logic just sketched
disjunctive syllogism is valid, for the only designated value is 122. 
Let us now turn on the truth tables. They are (i) truth-functional, in the sense
that the value of a compound is a function of the values of its immediate compo-
nents; (ii) normal, in the sense that the value of a compound is determined by the
classical rules whenever the components have classical value; (iii) monotonic, for
they preserve the relevant order.
Behind them there are four simple thoughts: first, they are an extension of the
Strong Kleene (K3) – in fact, whenever no component isp, they are exactly as K3; sec-
ond, the value ‘paradoxical’ behaves exactly like u in connection with 1 or 0; third,
the connection of u and p is always undefined; fourth, like K3, they let classical logic
be our guiding light, whenever we have “enough classical information”. Classical
logic, for instance, tells us that a conjunction is false whenever at least one conjunct
is false. Accordingly, if a conjunction has a false conjunct, the whole sentence be-
comes false, independently from the value of the other conjunct.
Discussion 2.4. Do the tables suit our intuitions about paradoxality? Besides the
case of negation, it is hard to determine, since we do not utter, in the everyday life,
many compound sentences containing paradoxes as components. I shall thusmake
no claim to the optimality of the chosen scheme. By way of an example, however,
consider:
♣ The part before the comma of the sentence marked with a clubs sign
is untrue, or 0 = 0 [formalisable as λ ∨ 0  0].
♠ The part before the comma of the sentencemarked with a spade sign
is untrue, or 0 = 1 [formalisable as λ ∨ 0  1].
22Whether the disjunctive syllogism is a plus or a minus is controversial. See Priest, (2006, p. 154) for a
brief discussion.
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Although these sentences are highly artificial, they ought to be taken into account
when working with formal languages. The former seems to be true, simply because
it is a disjunction containing a true disjunct. And, as already remarked, classical
logic ought to be our guiding light, whenever classical information is enough.
The secondsentencemight give some troubles. According to the tables, it is para-
doxical and this choice is prompted by two considerations. The first: the sentence
is surely neither true nor undefined. Now, if we assume that ♠ is untrue, then both
disjuncts have to be untrue (this implication presupposes, again, to follow classical
logic as far as possible). But the part before the comma is untrue if, and only if, it
is true. The second consideration: it creates a parallel with K3 and with the work of
Kripke. In fact, within Kripke’s framework, ♠ would be undefined, and undefined
is the value ascribed to λ. Since in the new framework λ has a new truth value, the
whole sentence does get a newvalue aswell. Nonetheless, the idea that the sentence
is assigned the value of λ is preserved. 
We can nowmove on to the last part of this section.
2.4 The New Interpretation ofT
To beginwith, I shall exploit Kripke’s construction ofMFP: in the new interpretation
ofT , E and A will be identical to E∞ and A∞ (the extension and the anti-extension of
T inMFP). Of interest is the definition of the paradox-set and the differentiation be-
tween paradoxical and ungrounded-and-unparadoxical sentences. Before I begin,
a quick remark on the choice of letting E and A be identical to E∞ and A∞. Whereas
Kripke maintains that the minimal fixed point is probably the most natural model
for the intuitive concept of truth, I go a bit further: MFP is the most natural model
for the ordinary truth predicate23. In a longer philosophical work I would have de-
fended this claim. But limits in space urges us to move on to the formal definition
of X .
Recall the way Kripke defines paradoxical sentences, namely: a sentence is para-
doxical if, and only if, it does not have a truth value in any (consistent) fixed point,
whereas a sentence is ungrounded and unparadoxical iff it has a truth value in some
fixedpoint, different from theminimal one. Now, onemight be tempted to formalise
Kripke’s characterisation word for word, defining X as the set of all (codes of) sen-
tences that are undefined in every fixed point. Such a definitionwouldmake all Liar
sentences paradoxical, and all Truth-teller sentences unparadoxical – and these are
indeed two desiderata of the new model. But an unpleasant consequence would
23My statement ranges over kripkean models.
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derive from it. Let τ be a Truth-teller24. If I defined X as above, the following, e.g.,
would hold in the newmodel:
V (τ ∧ ¬τ) ∨ λ = u V T p(τ ∧ ¬τ) ∨ λq = p (6)
V (τ ∨ ¬τ) ∧ λ = u V T p(τ ∨ ¬τ) ∧ λq = p (7)
As (6)-left never gets a truth value in any fixed point, it should be element of X ,
so that (6)-right would be paradoxical in 〈M, (E, A, X )〉. Yet, (6)-left is undefined in
〈M, (E, A, X )〉, because τ ∧ ¬τ is undefined and λ paradoxical25. Similarly for (7).
Therefore, I cannot define X this way, for that would mean abandoning the pro-
spect of constructing a model where every sentence ϕ has the same truth value as
T pϕq. I shall hence posit a different definition.
Kripke, (1975, p. 701) makes the following example: “Suppose we are explaining the
word ‘true’ to someone who does not yet understand it. We may say that we are
entitled to assert (or deny) of any sentence that it is true precisely under the circum-
stances when we can assert (or deny) the sentence itself”. Following this example, I
would suggest:
we are entitled to assert of any sentence that it is paradoxical under the
circumstances when we cannot assert the sentence itself, without being
led to assert that it is untrue.
This informal picture is obviously meant to characterise truth-related paradoxes,
like the Liar or like the example from Kripke, (1975, p. 691), which involves a kind of
cross-reference between statements: Jones says
(I) Most of Nixon’s assertions about Watergate are false.
Suppose now that Nixon’s assertions about Watergate are evenly balanced between
the true and the false, except for one problematic case:
(II) Everything Jones says about Watergate is true.
Suppose, in addition, that (I) is the only statement of Jones about Watergate. It is
easy to verify that we cannot assert (I) (or (II)), without being led to assert that it is
untrue: If we assert (I), we are implying that (II) is untrue. But this implies that (I) is
untrue. Similarly if we deny (I)26.
24Whereas Liar sentenceshave the form ∃v0(ϕ(v0)∧¬T (v0)), Truth-teller sentences are ∃v0(ϕ(v0)∧T (v0)).
In both cases, the code of the sentence in the only number satisfying the formula ϕ(v0).
25Notice that, although I haven’t yet shown it in details, τ is undefined and λ paradoxical according to
the definition of quantified sentences above. See infra, PROPOSITION 3.1, for details.
26Paying attention at some details, also Yablo’s paradoxical sequence (see Yablo, 1993) could be de-
scribed in the samemanner.
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Let me now turn the informal description of paradoxical sentences into a formal
definition. I shall define the set X inductively. After that, I shall explain how the
formal definition relates to the informal characterisation.
First, let ζ(n, S) abbreviate
(i) n = gn(ϕ) 1 PA ` ϕ↔ ¬T pϕq; or
(ii) n = gn(¬ϕ) 1 gn(ϕ) ∈ S ; or
(iii) n = gn(ϕ ∨ ψ) 1 (gn(ϕ) ∈ S 0 gn(ψ) ∈ S) 1 (gn(ϕ) ∈ S ⇒ gn(ψ) ∈ S ∪ A) 1 (gn(ψ) ∈ S ⇒ gn(ϕ) ∈ S ∪ A); or
(iv) n = gn(ϕ ∧ ψ) 1 (gn(ϕ) ∈ S 0 gn(ψ) ∈ S) 1 (gn(ϕ) ∈ S ⇒ gn(ψ) ∈ S ∪ E ) 1 (gn(ψ) ∈ S ⇒ gn(ϕ) ∈ S ∪ E )27; or
(v) n = gn(∃viϕ(vi )) 1
∃m ∈ N  gn(ϕ(m)) ∈ S 1 \∀k ∈ N  gn(ϕ(k)) ∈ S ∪ A; or
(vi) n = gn(T (m)) 1 m ∈ S .
This gives rise to an operator Γ on the powerset of natural numbers, which is
monotone. It is well known that monotone operators on P(N) have fixed points.
The minimal one will be our set X .
Definition 2.5 (PARADOX OPERATOR). The paradox operator Γ : P(N) −→ P(N) is a
function on the powerset of N, defined thus:
Γ(S) = {n | ζ(n, S)}
Example 2.6. Let S0 = {gn(0  0)}. Then Γ(S0) will first of all contain all n, such
that n = gn(ϕ) and PA ` ϕ ↔ ¬T pϕq. Moreover, by condition (ii), it will contain
all n = gn(¬ϕ) such that gn(ϕ) ∈ S0. Now, since the only gn(ϕ) ∈ S0 is gn(0  0),
gn(¬(0  0)) will be the only (code of) sentence obtained through condition (ii); by
condition (iii), Γ(S0) will contain all n = gn(ϕ ∨ ψ) such that gn(ϕ) ∈ S0 or gn(ψ) ∈
S0 . . . and so forth. In our case, since S0 = {gn(0  0)}, Γ(S0) will contain sentences
like gn(0  0∨0  0) (because gn(0  0) ∈ S0), or gn(0  0∨1  2) (because gn(1  2)
∈ A) and so on. Obviously, it will not contain sentences like gn(0  0 ∨ 1  1) (be-
cause gn(1  1) < S0 ∪ A).
Notice that, since gn(λ) < S0 ∪ A ∪ E , sentences like λ ∨ ψ, λ ∧ ψ will not be in
Γ(S0), regardless of the ψ. However, being λ provably equivalent with ¬T pλq, it will
27The reader knows that the conjunction symbol is not part of the official language. I include it anyway,
to obtain a clearer overview.
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be, according to condition (i), in Γ(S0). Consequently, gn(λ ∨ ψ) or gn(λ ∧ ψ)will be
in Γ(Γ(S0)), whenever ψ respects the conditions imposed by the definition. 
In section 2.2, I have claimed that X ∩ E = ∅ and that X ∩ A = ∅. Clearly, if
we start the iteration of Γ as shown in EXAMPLE 2.6, we will not obtain this result.
On the other hand, I have also claimed that X is the least fixed point of Γ, which is
obtained by starting the sequence with S0 = ∅. To show that Γ has a least fixed point,
it suffices to show that it is a monotone function on P(N). After having shown the
monotonicity, it will follow from general theory of inductive definitions that Γ has a
least fixed point.
Lemma 2.7 (MONOTONICITY). Γ is monotone. That is: for all Si, S j ∈ P(N),
Si ⊆ S j ⇒ Γ(Si ) ⊆ Γ(S j )
Proof. Let S1 ⊆ S2 and assume, towards a contradiction
∃n ∈ N(n ∈ Γ(S1) 1 n < Γ(S2)) (8)
Let k be a number obtained through existential elimination. From the assumption
that k ∈ Γ(S1) follows:
(i ) k = gn(ϕ) 1 PA ` ϕ↔ ¬T pϕq; or
(i i ) k = gn(¬ϕ) 1 gn(ϕ) ∈ S1; or
(i i i ) k = gn(ϕ ∨ ψ) 1 (gn(ϕ) ∈ S1 0 gn(ψ) ∈ S1) 1 (gn(ϕ) ∈ S1 ⇒ gn(ψ) ∈ S1 ∪ A) 1 (gn(ψ) ∈ S1 ⇒ gn(ϕ) ∈ S1 ∪ A); or
(iv ) k = gn(ϕ ∧ ψ) 1 (gn(ϕ) ∈ S1 0 gn(ψ) ∈ S1) 1 (gn(ϕ) ∈ S1 ⇒ gn(ψ) ∈ S1 ∪ E ) 1 (gn(ψ) ∈ S1 ⇒ gn(ϕ) ∈ S1 ∪ E ); or
(v ) k = gn(∃viϕ(vi )) 1
∃n ∈ N  gn(ϕ(n)) ∈ S1 1 \∀m ∈ N  gn(ϕ(m)) ∈ S1 ∪ A; or
(vi ) k = gn(T (n)) 1 n ∈ S1.
It can be shown that each of (i )-(vi ) implies that k ∈ Γ(S2).
If (i ), then trivially k ∈ Γ(S2).
If (i i ), as S1 ⊆ S2, gn(ϕ) ∈ S2, and hence gn(¬ϕ) ∈ Γ(S2).
For (i i i ), let me proceed slowly, step by step. First of all, I have to show that:
(i i i ) ⇒ (i i i )[S2/S1] (9)
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That is: if (i i i ) is true (viz. if k = gn(ϕ ∨ ψ) 1(gn(ϕ) ∈ S1 0 gn(ψ) ∈ S1) 1 . . . ), then
also (i i i )[S2/S1] is verified. Now, since we are assuming (i i i ), we are assuming in
particular that (gn(ϕ) ∈ S1 0 gn(ψ) ∈ S1), which implies the second conjunct of
(i i i )[S2/S1], i.e. (gn(ϕ) ∈ S2 0 gn(ψ) ∈ S2) (the first conjunct holds anyway). In order
to show the third conjunct, I shall conduct a proof by cases: exploiting the assump-
tion that (gn(ϕ) ∈ S1 0 gn(ψ) ∈ S1), I shall show that both implies the third conjunct
of (i i i )[S2/S1]. In symbols:
(gn(ϕ) ∈ S1 0 gn(ψ) ∈ S1) ⇒ (gn(ϕ) ∈ S2 ⇒ gn(ψ) ∈ S2 ∪ A) 1 (gn(ψ) ∈ S2 ⇒ gn(ϕ) ∈ S2 ∪ A) (10)
Assume first that gn(ϕ) ∈ S1. Then gn(ϕ) ∈ S2, and therefore the second conjunct of
(10) is true. To show the first conjunct, notice that from the assumption that gn(ϕ) ∈
S1 follows that gn(ψ) ∈ S1 ∪ A and hence that gn(ψ) ∈ S2 ∪ A. This verifies the first
conjunct of (10) and concludes the first part of the proof by cases, that is to say: if
gn(ϕ) ∈ S1, then the third conjunct of (i i i )[S2/S1] is true.
The secondpart of theproofbycases,which involves theassumption that gn(ψ) ∈
S1, is exactly the same (mutatis mutandis, of course). Hence, if (i i i ), then (i i i )[S2/S1]
and therefore k ∈ Γ(S2).
If (iv ), then it suffices to substitute E for A in the argument above.
If (v ), then there is a n ∈ N, such that gn(ϕ(n)) ∈ S2 and for all m ∈ N, gn(ϕ(m)) ∈
S2 ∪ A. Therefore gn(∃v0ϕ(v0)) ∈ Γ(S2).
If (vi ), then n ∈ S2 and hence gn(T (n)) ∈ Γ(S2).
(8) is therefore false, and the monotonicity of Γ is proved. 
Since Γ is a monotone operator on P(N), it has a least fixed point.
Lemma 2.8 (FIXED POINT). Γ has aminimal fixed point, i.e. there is a set S such that
Γ(S) = S , and for all S ′ = Γ(S ′), S ⊆ S ′.
Proof Sketch. Every monotone function pi : P −→ P on an inductive poset P 28 has a
(unique) least fixed point. Since the paradox operator Γ is a monotone function on
the power set of natural numbers, and since P(N) is an inductive poset, Γ has a least
fixed point29. 
28AposetP is inductive (or chain-complete) if every chainS ⊆ P has a least upperbound. (Moschovakis,
2006, Def. 6.10, p. 75).
29SeeMoschovakis, (2006, §§6-7), andMoschovakis, (1974, pp. 6-8) for details. The former contains an
extensive, yet accessible, analysis of fixed points in general. The latter is a study of inductive definitions.
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The informal description of paradoxical sentences stated above is captured by
the first clause of the formal definition, viz. n = gn(ϕ) 1 PA ` ϕ ↔ ¬T pϕq. It makes
sure that the “atomic” paradoxical sentences are elements of X . These sentences,
evidently, are not atomic in the usual sense. Nevertheless, they are atomic in the
sense that they are the minimum required to yield a paradox. All other clauses are
meant to avoid theproblemwhichwouldhave followed fromadefinition in “Kripke-
style”30. In other words: their goal is, on the basis of the truth tables presented in
§ 2.3.2, to assure that in the new model a sentence ϕ is paradoxical if, and only if,
T pϕq is paradoxical too. A proof of this claim is contained in the following and last
section, which contain the main theorem of the paper.
3 Analysis of the NewModel
Let us check whether the model constructed thus far adequately models the truth
predicate, andwhether it improves the kripkeanMFP. First of all, I will show that the
Liar gets assigned value p. Thereafter, I shall prove that the new model verifies the
metalinguistic T-Schema.
Proposition 3.1. In 〈M, (E, A, X )〉 both λ and ¬T pλq are paradoxical.
Proof. I follow thenotation of LEMMA 1.1. Since λ is provably equivalent (inPA) with
¬T pλq, it follows that gn(λ) ∈ X and thereforeV(T pλq) = p iffV(¬T pλq) = p.
To prove thatV(λ) = p, as λ is a sentence beginning with a quantifier, namely
∃v0
 
v0  p βq ∧ ∃v1(Diag(v0, v1) ∧ ¬T (v1))︸                                                ︷︷                                                ︸
λ−(v0)

I have to show that there is a n ∈ N, such that λ−(n) is paradoxical, and that for all
m ∈ N, λ−(m) is either false or paradoxical.
It is clear that for allm , gn(β), λ−(m) is false. Therefore, I only have to show that
λ−(p βq) is paradoxical:
V(λ−(p βq) = p) ⇔
V p βq  p βq ∧ ∃v1(Diag(p βq, v1) ∧ ¬T (v1)) = p ⇔
V ∃v1(Diag(p βq, v1) ∧ ¬T (v1)︸                          ︷︷                          ︸
λ−−(v1)
) = p (11)
(11) is easily established. To begin with, for any m , gn(λ), λ−−(m) is false, since
30Aword ofwarning: I certainly do notmean to suggest that Kripke, in this context, would have defined
‘paradoxical’ as he did in theOutline.
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V(Diag(p βq, m)) = 0, for allm , gn(λ). Furthermore, λ−−(pλq), i.e.
Diag(p βq, pλq) ∧ ¬T pλq (12)
is paradoxical, sinceV(¬T pλq) = p andV(Diag(p βq, pλq)) = 1. 
I will not show the details for the Truth-teller being undefined, since they are,
mutatis mutandis, the same.
We can now turn to the main theorem:
Theorem 3.2. (METALINGUISTIC T-SCHEMA) For all ϕ ∈ L tpa , the following holds:
V(ϕ) = V(T pϕq)
Proof. The proof is quite straightforward, although the details are fairly lengthy. Let
me give an outline first: as we know, in MFP every sentence ϕ has the same truth
value as the sentenceT pϕq. LEMMA 3.3 proves that a sentence is true (false) inMFP
if, and only if, it has value 1 (0) in 〈M, (E, A, X )〉. This gives us the so-calledNec (from
ϕ infer T pϕq) and Conec (from T pϕq infer ϕ): a sentence ϕ has truth value 1 (0) in
〈M, (E, A, X )〉 if, and only if, the sentence T pϕq has value 1 (0) too. To complete the
proof, it remains to be shown that a sentence ϕ is paradoxical if, and only if, the
sentenceT pϕq is paradoxical as well. This will be done in LEMMA 3.5.
Lemma 3.3. For all ϕ ∈ L tpa , the following holds:
〈M, (E∞, A∞)〉 |=sk ϕ⇔V(ϕ) = 1
〈M, (E∞, A∞)〉 |=sk ¬ϕ⇔V(ϕ) = 0
Proof. The left-to-right direction
〈M, (E∞, A∞)〉 |=sk ϕ⇒V(ϕ) = 1 (13)
〈M, (E∞, A∞)〉 |=sk ¬ϕ⇒V(ϕ) = 0 (14)
is evident, since (i) both models have the standard interpretation M for Lpa , (ii)
(E∞, A∞) = (E, A), and (iii) the new logic is exactly like K3 whenever no conjunct has
value p.
As a shortcut for the right-to-left direction, Iwill prove that if a sentencehas value
1 or 0 in 〈M, (E, A, X )〉, then it is not undefined inMFP. It follows that if a sentence
has value 1 (0) in 〈M, (E, A, X )〉 then it is true (false) inMFP, for it cannot be unde-
fined, nor false (true) – otherwise it would have value 0 (1) in 〈M, (E, A, X )〉. Let now
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‘〈M, (E∞, A∞)〉 =|sk ϕ’ abbreviate ‘ϕ is undefined inMFP’. It can be shown that
(V(ϕ) = 1 0 V(ϕ) = 0) ⇒ ¬ 〈M, (E∞, A∞)〉 =|sk ϕ
A simple induction verifies the statement.
ϕ ≡ T (n) If V(T (n)) = 1 or V(T (n)) = 0, then n ∈ E ∪ A iff n ∈ E∞ ∪ A∞ iff
¬ 〈M, (E∞, A∞)〉 =|sk T (n).
ϕ ≡ ¬ψ If V(¬ψ) = 1 or V(¬ψ) = 0, then V(ψ) = 0 or V(ψ) = 1. Thus, by i.h.,
¬ 〈M, (E∞, A∞)〉 =|sk ψ iff ¬ 〈M, (E∞, A∞)〉 =|sk ¬ψ.
ϕ ≡ ψ ∨ χ By contraposition, 〈M, (E∞, A∞)〉 =|sk ψ∨ χ iff at least one disjunct, say
ψ, is undefined and the other, say χ, is not true. By i.h.,V(ψ) , 1 andV(ψ) , 0, and
thereforeV(ψ∨ χ) , 0. To show thatV(ψ∨ χ) , 1, it suffices to show thatV(χ) , 1,
which follows from the fact that χ is either false or undefined inMFP: if it is false,
i.e. if 〈M, (E∞, A∞)〉 |=sk ¬χ then V(χ) = 0, and if 〈M, (E∞, A∞)〉 =|sk χ, then by i.h.
V(χ) , 1. Consequently,V(ψ ∨ χ) , 1.
ϕ ≡ ∃vi (ψ(vi )) By contraposition, 〈M, (E∞, A∞)〉 =|sk ∃vi (ψ(vi )) iff there is no n ∈ N,
such that 〈M, (E∞, A∞)〉 |=sk ψ(n), and for at least some n ∈ N, ψ(n) is undefined.
Hence, by i.h., for some n ∈ N, V(ψ(n)) , 0, and thusV(∃vi (ψ(vi ))) , 0. To show that
V(∃vi (ψ(vi ))) , 1, assume the contrary to derive a contradiction.V(∃vi (ψ(vi ))) = 1 iff
∃n ∈ N(V(ψ(n)) = 1), iff, by i.h., ¬ 〈M, (E∞, A∞)〉 =|sk ψ(n). Then either 〈M, (E∞, A∞)〉
|=sk ψ(n)or 〈M, (E∞, A∞)〉 |=sk ¬ψ(n). The former implies 〈M, (E∞, A∞)〉 |=sk ∃vi (ψ(vi ));
the latter implies thatV(ψ(n)) = 0, contradicting the assumption. 
LEMMA 3.3 yields the first half of THEOREM 3.2:
Corollary 3.4. (NEC AND CONEC) For all ϕ ∈ L tpa , the following holds:
V(ϕ) = 1⇔V(T pϕq) = 1
V(ϕ) = 0⇔V(T pϕq) = 0
Proof. Straightforward consequence of LEMMA 3.3. 
The lemma below completes the proof.
Lemma 3.5. For all ϕ ∈ L tpa , the following holds:
V(ϕ) = p ⇔ V(T pϕq) = p
Proof. The proof is by induction on the complexity of ϕ.
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ϕ ≡ T (n) V(T (n)) = p iff n ∈ X iff, by DEFINITION 2.5-(vi), gn(T (n)) ∈ X iff
V(T pT (n)q) = p.
Remark 3.6. Notice that we can now use the induction hypothesisV(ϕ) = V(T pϕq)
for all atomic formulas. 
ϕ ≡ ¬ψ V(¬ψ) = p iff V(ψ) = p iff, by i.h., V(T pψq) = p iff gn(ψ) ∈ X iff, by
DEFINITION 2.5-(ii), gn(¬ψ) ∈ X iffV(T p¬ψq) = p.
Disjunction
ϕ ≡ ψ ∨ χ; ⇒ V(ψ ∨ χ) = p iff
(A) At least one between ψ and χ, say ψ, is paradoxical.
(B) χ is either false or paradoxical.
From (A),
V(ψ) = p i.h.⇔ V(T pψq) = p ⇔ gn(ψ) ∈ X (15)
Towards a contradiction, assume thatV(T pψ ∨ χq) , p, iff
(i) V(T pψ ∨ χq) = 1; or
(ii) V(T pψ ∨ χq) = 0; or
(iii) V(T pψ ∨ χq) = u.
We can rule out (i) and (ii), since, by COROLLARY 3.4, V(T pψ ∨ χq) = 1(0) iffV(ψ ∨
χ) = 1(0), but we are assuming V(ψ ∨ χ) = p. If (iii), then gn(ψ ∨ χ) < X . On the
basis of DEFINITION 2.5-(iii), since we are assuming that gn(ψ) ∈ X , we can argue as
follows:
(gn(ψ) ∈ X 1 gn(ψ ∨ χ) < X ) ⇒ gn(χ) < A ∪ X (16)
It follows that either gn(χ) ∈ E , or gn(χ) < E ∪ A ∪ X . If the former, thenV(T p χq) =
1 ⇔ V(χ) = 1, and if the latter, then V(T p χq) = u i.h.⇔ V(χ) = u. Both contra-
dict (B). Hence all (i), (ii), and (iii) deliver a contradiction, from which derives that
V(T pψ ∨ χq) = p.
ϕ ≡ ψ ∨ χ; ⇐ V(T pψ ∨ χq) = p iff gn(ψ ∨ χ) ∈ X , iff
(A) At least one between gn(ψ) and gn(χ), say gn(ψ), is element of X .
(B) gn(χ) ∈ A ∪ X .
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From (A)
gn(ψ) ∈ X ⇔ V(T pψq) = p i.h.⇔ V(ψ) = p (17)
Towards a contradiction, assumeV(ψ ∨ χ) , p. Then – again due to COROLLARY 3.4
–V(ψ ∨ χ) = u. But ifV(ψ ∨ χ) = u andV(ψ) = p, thenV(χ) = u and therefore, by
i.h., gn(χ) < A ∪ X , which contradicts (B).
Existential Quantifier
ϕ ≡ ∃v0ψ(v0); ⇒ V(∃v0ψ(v0)) = p, iff
(A) ∃n ∈ N (V(ψ(n)) = p).
(B) \∀m ∈ N (V(ψ(m)) = p 0 V(ψ(m)) = 0).
Using the induction hypothesis, (A) and (B) yield:
(A ′) ∃n ∈ N (gn(ψ(n)) ∈ X ).
(B ′) \∀m ∈ N (gn(ψ(m)) ∈ A ∪ X ).
We derive by DEFINITION 2.5-(v) that gn(∃v0ψ(v0)) ∈ X , and therefore that
V(T p∃v0ψ(v0)q) = p.
ϕ ≡ ∃viψ(vi ); ⇐ V(T p∃viψ(vi )q) = p, iff gn(∃viψ(vi )) ∈ X , iff
(A) ∃n ∈ N (gn(ψ(n)) ∈ X ).
(B) \∀m ∈ N (gn(ψ(m)) ∈ A ∪ X ).
(A) and (B) imply
(A ′) ∃n ∈ N  V(T pψ(n)q) = p.
(B ′) \∀m ∈ N  V(T pψ(m)q) = p 0 V(T pψ(m)q) = 0.
From (A ′), we derive by induction that ∃n ∈ N (V(ψ(n)) = p). From (B ′), on the other
hand, we derive that \∀m ∈ N (V(ψ(m)) = p 0 V(ψ(m)) = 0). Therefore, according to
the definition ofV ,V(∃viψ(vi )) = p. 
THEOREM 3.2 derives from COROLLARY 3.4 and LEMMA 3.5. 
RivistaItalianadiFilosofiaAnaliticaJunior
7:2
(2016)
41
Luca Castaldo A NewModel for the Liar
4 What’s next?
There are two questions I didn’t address, which lead to an obvious further step. The
first is whether the new logic, together with the new model-theoretical framework,
may be useful to deal with other paradoxes. Consider, for instance, the Grelling-
Nelson paradox (Grelling and Nelson, 1907) involving the predicate “is heterologi-
cal”31. Within the new framework, one might argue that “‘heterological’ is hetero-
logical” is (like the Liar) paradoxical, for ‘heterological’ cannot consistently be con-
tained in the extension or in the anti-extension of “is heterological”, whereas “‘au-
tological’ is heterological” is (like the Truth-teller) simply undefined.
The second question is how to obtain a proper theory of truth, i.e. how an ax-
iomatisation of the new model may look like32. Additionally, one might try to add
a “Łukasiewicz conditional” to the new logic, to the effect that f→(p, p) = 1. Such a
conditional couldmake λ ↔ ¬T pλq truewhile both λ and¬T pλqwere still paradox-
ical. Of course, if one decides to add such a conditional, the interpretation ofT must
be accordingly modified, in order to preserve the metalinguistic T-Schema. As it is
now defined, gn(λ ↔ ¬T pλq) < E , and henceV(T pλ ↔ ¬T pλqq) , 1. Yet, if in the
hypothetical new frameworkV(λ ↔ ¬T pλq) = 1, then its code better be element of
E . This seems to me worthy of study33: it does seem right to maintain that the Liar
sentence is true if and only if untrue. Would it then not be worthwhile to investigate
a theorywithinwhich bothT pλq and¬T pλq are paradoxical, butwhere nonetheless
T pλq ↔ ¬T pλq is true?
31Mention should be made at this point of the work of Martin, (1967, 1968), who tries to propose one
solution for both Liar and Grelling-Nelson paradoxes.
32I guess that an appropriate axiomatisation of the model presented here will result in a system some-
where in the neighbourhood of PKF (partial Kripke-Feferman).
33A study in a similar direction is due to Field, (2002, 2008), who adds a new conditional to K3, which
is not definable as usual by negation and disjunction.
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